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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission denying

unemployment compensation to Claimant-Appellant, Joan Thrall. The Commission concluded
that Thrall was not entitled to benefits because she had voluntarily quit her employment with her
employer, Respondent, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center ("St. Luke's"), without good cause.
Thrall challenges the Commission's decision, contending that the Commission erred as a matter
of law in concluding that she voluntarily quit her employment. She contends that the record
establishes that she was forced to resign, that a forced resignation is effectively a discharge, and
that there is insufficient evidence to support the Commission's alternate ruling that she was
discharged for misconduct. Although Thrall attempts to frame the issues on appeal as pure legal
issues subject to free review, a close review of her arguments reveals she is challenging several
critical factual findings, which comprise the very foundation of the Commission's decision.
Idaho law is clear that the Commission's factual findings may not be disturbed on appeal
if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence; this is true, even if conflicting
evidence exists to the contrary. Indeed, the Idaho Constitution mandates that only questions of
law may be reviewed by this Court in an appeal of this nature, which means that the
Commission's factual findings may not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Thrall has failed
to demonstrate the existence of clear error; thus, the Commission's decision denying her benefits
must be upheld.
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B.

Statement of Facts and Relevant Proceedings 1

The underlying facts, unless indicated otherwise, are undisputed by the parties. From
March 2000 to October 2013, Thrall was employed by St. Luke's as a laboratory technician in
the Boise Pathology Group, where her primary job duties included tracking patient specimens
and inputting patient information. Agency Record ("R."), Vol. I, p. 18. During the bulk of her
employment, Thrall made a few errors, but otherwise successfully performed her job. Id. In
April 2013, however, she started making patient identification errors. These errors constituted a
violation of St. Luke's policies and procedures. Id. Thrall was placed on corrective action for
the errors. Several months later, in August 2013, she received a written warning for mislabeling
and erroneously selecting the wrong patients on lab specimens. Id. As a result, St. Luke's
provided Thrall with coaching and counseling. Id. Thrall noted on her written warning notice
that she planned to improve the inputting of patient information in the future. Id. However, one
week before her separation of employment (which occurred on October 4, 2013), Thrall was
suspended for making another error on the job. Id. Later, on October 1, 2013, she made yet
another error. Thrall had received a specimen identified with a patient name and birthdate.

1 Contrary to this Court's rules, in her opening brief, Thrall provides little to no citation
to the record to support her summary of the underlying facts. See Appellant's Opening Brief
("Op. Br."), at pp. 4-5. The Court should find this fact especially troubling in this appeal where,
as explained below, the burden lies with Thrall to establish that there is insufficient evidence in
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There were two patients with the same name, but different birthdates in the employer's system.
Thrall selected the wrong patient when identifying the specimen. Id.
According to Thrall's supervisor, properly identifying patients is fundamental to
providing safe quality patient care and laboratory results. Hearing Transcript ("Tr."), p. 14, LL.
8-9. The failure to make a proper identification could result in the release ofresults to the wrong
individual or release of wrong results to the right patient. Tr., p. 14, LL. 9-13. An identification
error could also mean that a patient's history is not transferred properly if the error is not
discovered. Tr., p. 14, LL. 13-16.
On October 4, 2013, after returning to work from a week of suspension, Thrall met with
her supervisors, Anne Sergeant, the assistant director of laboratory services, and Brenda
Miranda, the lab manager. R., Vol. I, p. 19. Thrall testified that, during this meeting, her
supervisors told her she could either resign or she would be terminated. Id. Her supervisors, on
the other hand, testified that at no time during the October 4 meeting did they tell Thrall she
would be terminated if she did not resign; rather, they testified that the three of them discussed
whether resigning would be in Thrall's best interest and, after some discussion of the matter,
Thrall eventually made the decision to resign. Id.; Tr., p. 12, L. 11 -p. 13, L. 21; Tr., p. 17, LL.
17-22 (Sergeant testimony); Tr., p. 19, LL. 2-8 (Miranda testimony). Both Sergeant and Miranda

the record to support the Commission's factual findings regarding how her termination from
employment came about.
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testified they believed Thrall's resignation was voluntary. Tr., p. 12, LL. 11-22 (Sergeant
testimony); Tr., p. 19, LL. 2-8 (Miranda testimony).
After Thrall applied for unemployment benefits, which application was denied by the
Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL"), she appealed the IDOL's decision to an Appeals
Examiner, who held a telephonic hearing in which testimony was received from Thrall and her
supervisors, Sergeant and Miranda. R., Vol. I, p. 1. The Appeals Examiner issued a written
decision concluding that Thrall had been forced to resign, the resignation must be viewed as a
discharge, and, because the employer had failed to demonstrate that Thrall was discharged for
misconduct, Thrall was entitled to unemployment benefits. R., Vol. I, pp. 1-5. St. Luke's
appealed this decision to the Commission, which after conducting a de nova review of the
record, reversed the Appeals Examiner's decision and concluded that Thrall had voluntarily quit
her job without good cause connected with her employment, thus, she is not entitled to benefits.
R., Vol. I, pp. 17-26. Thrall filed a timely appeal of the Commission's decision with this Court.
R., Vol. I, pp. 27-30 (original Notice of Appeal); R., Vol. I, pp. 34-37 (Amended Notice of
Appeal).

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Thrall incorrectly frames the bulk of issues she has raised on appeal as questions oflaw,
and she erroneously contends that these legal issues may be reviewed de nova or for abuse of
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discretion. 2 See Op. Br., at p. 4 (framing issues on appeal as whether Commission erred as a
matter oflaw or abused its discretion when issuing certain rulings). However, the bulk of rulings
Thrall challenges on appeal, specifically, the Commission's ruling that she voluntarily quit, that
she did not have good cause to quit and that her errors on the job constituted misconduct, are all
factual findings made by the Commission that may not be disturbed on appeal as long as they are
supported by substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence. See Welch v. Cowles
Publ'g Co., 127 Idaho 361,363, 900 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1995). As a consequence, these issues
Thrall has raised on appeal should more appropriately be framed as follows:
1)

Whether substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's

finding that Thrall voluntarily quit her employment without good cause; and
2)

Assuming Thrall was discharged (as opposed to voluntarily quitting her

employment), whether substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's
finding that she was discharged for misconduct.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court's scope of review is
limited to questions of law, and this Court may not disturb the Commission's factual findings
when they are supported by substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence. See Idaho

2 On appeal of the Commission's decision concerning unemployment benefits, questions
of law are reviewed de nova, not for abuse of discretion. Current v. Haddons Fencing, Inc., 152
Idaho 10, 12,266 P.3d 485,487 (2011).
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Const., Art. V, § 9; Bringman v. New Albertsons, Inc., Id. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 40232, *3 (Aug.
4, 2014). "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion." Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d
1265, 1269 (2003). In reviewing the Commission's factual findings, this Court should "not
consider re-weighing the evidence or whether it would have drawn different conclusions from
the evidence presented." Current, 152 Idaho at 13, 266 P.3d at 488. The Commission's
conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of evidence should not be disturbed unless they
are clearly erroneous. Buckham v. Idaho Elk's Rehab. Hosp., 141 Idaho 338, 340, 109 P.3d 726,
728 (2005). "All facts and inferences [should] be viewed by this Court in a light most favorable
to the prevailing party before the Commission," which is St. Luke's in the present matter. See
Current, 152 Idaho at 13, 266 P.3d at 488.

IV.

IDAHO'S EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LAW

This appeal arises under Idaho's Employment Security Law, Idaho Code§ 72-1301 et
seq., which provides a statutory process to obtain unemployment compensation benefits by Idaho

workers who become "unemployed through no fault of their own." I.C. § 72-1302. Under this
Act, "an unemployment compensation benefit claimant bears the burden of proving his or her
eligibility for benefits." Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 417, 614 P.2d 955, 957
(1980). To obtain unemployment benefits, a claimant must prove "all necessary information
pertinent to eligibility," including the cause of his or her unemployment. See I.C. § 72-1366(1),
(5)-(10); Bringman, Id. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 40232, *4; see also Hine v. Twin Falls Cnty., 114
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Idaho 244,245, 755 P.2d 1282, 1283 (1988) ("The burden of proving and establishing statutory
eligibility for unemployment benefits rests with the claimaint.").
A claimant is ineligible for benefits if his unemployment is "due to the fact that he left his
employment voluntarily without good cause connected with his employment, or ... he was
discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment." I.C. § 72-1366(5). "[T]he
claimant bears the burden of establishing good cause when she has voluntarily terminated her
employment." Hine, 114 Idaho at 245, 755 P.2d at 1283. "Whether a claimant voluntarily quit a
job for good cause in connection with the employment is a question of fact" to be determined by
the Commission. Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343,347, 63 P.3d 469,473 (2003). Similarly,
the claimant bears the initial burden of proving she was discharged; once the claimant has
satisfied this burden, to preclude an award of benefits, the burden shifts to the employer to prove
the employee was discharged for misconduct in connection with her employment. Johnson v.
Idaho Central Credit Union, 127 Idaho 867, 869, 908 P.2d 560, 562 (1995). "Whether an

employee's behavior constitutes misconduct is a factual determination" to be determined by the
Commission and must be upheld on appeal, unless not supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Harris v. Elec. Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1, 3, 105 P.3d 267,269 (2004).
The term "misconduct," as that term is used in the Act, has been interpreted by Idaho
courts to mean "willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of
the employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to
expect of his employees." Johns v. S.H Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544,548,307 P.2d 217,219
(1957). This standard has been codified under IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02, which provides:
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Misconduct that disqualifies a claimant for benefits must be
connected with the claimant's employment and involve one of the
following:
a. Disregard of Employer's Interest. A willful, intentional
disregard of the employer's interest.
b. Violation of Reasonable Rules. A deliberate violation
of the employer's reasonable rules.
c. Disregard of Standards of Behavior. If the alleged
misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior which
the employer has a right to expect of his employees, there is no
requirement that the claimant's conduct be willful, intentional or
deliberate. The claimant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant.
The test for misconduct in 'standard of behavior cases' is as
follows:
i. Whether claimant's conduct fell below the standard of
behavior expected by the employer; and
ii. Whether the employer's expectation was objectively
reasonable in the particular case.
(Emphasis added). "In order to be reasonable, an employer's expectation should flow naturally
from the employment relationship or be communicated to the employee." Locker v. How Soel,
Inc., 151 Idaho 696, 700, 263 P.3d 750, 754 (2011). Whether a claimant has disregarded the

standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect from its employees, and whether
the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable in a particular case are factual
determinations to be made by the Commission. Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277,
279, 787 P.2d 263,265 (1990).
In the present case, the Commission found that Thrall voluntarily quit her employment
without good cause and, thus, is not entitled to benefits. Alternatively, the Commission found
that, even if the facts surrounding Thrall's termination can be construed as a forced resignation
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and, therefore, a discharge, Thrall was discharged for misconduct; thus, she is not entitled to
benefits. As explained below, these rulings, which Thrall challenges on appeal, are factual
determinations supported by substantial and competent evidence; thus, the Commission's
decision denying benefits must be upheld.

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

Substantial and Competent Evidence Exists to Support the Commission's Finding
that Thrall Voluntarily Quit Her Employment Without Good Cause.
As previously noted, Thrall, as the claimant, bears the initial burden of proving she was

discharged. Johnson, 127 Idaho at 869, 908 P.2d at 562. The Commission held that she was not
discharged, rather, she voluntarily quit and that she did so without good cause connected with
her employment. R., Vol. I, pp. 20-22, 25. Whether a claimant voluntarily quit with good cause,
or whether she was discharged, are factual determinations that may not be disturbed on appeal if
they are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Ewins, 138 Idaho at
347, 63 P.3d at 473; Johnson, 127 Idaho at 869, 908 P.2d at 562. Because substantial and
competent evidence exists to support the Commission's finding that Thrall voluntarily quit
without good cause connected to her employment, Thrall's contention otherwise must be
rejected.
As a threshold matter, Thrall argues in her opening brief that the Commission made an
error in law when it concluded that a forced resignation is not a discharge. Op. Br., at pp. 6-9.
However, this is not what the Commission held. Rather, the Commission held that Thrall chose
to resign, implying she was not forced to resign. R., Vol. I, p. 20. Thrall herself appears to
acknowledge that choosing to resign to avoid a potential/possible discharge may be considered a
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voluntary quit; whereas, an employee who is given no choice but to be fired, who then quits to
avoid the imminent discharge, may, in effect, constitute a discharge. Op. Br., at p. 8. Courts in
other jurisdictions recognize this distinction. See In the Matter of the Claim of M Reed, 590
N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (denying benefits, holding that quitting in anticipation
of a future discharge is a voluntary quit without good cause); Ganter v. Unemployment Comp.

Bd. of Review, 723 A.2d 272,273 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (acknowledging that employee's
resignation, which was done in part to avoid a potential discharge, was a voluntary termination).
As previously noted, the Commission here concluded that Thrall's separation was a
voluntary quit because she "chose to resign," meaning she was not coerced to resign. R., Vol. I,
p. 20. This finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence. For example, both of
Thrall's supervisors who were present during her separation meeting testified that they never
expressly told Thrall that she would face immediate termination if she did not resign. Tr., p. 12,
L. 11 - p. 13, L. 21; Tr., p. 17, LL. 17-25 (Sergeant testimony); Tr., p. 19, LL. 12-20 (Miranda

testimony). 3 Instead, as they testified, the parties discussed at length whether Thrall's
resignation would be in her best interest (Tr., p. 12, L. 11 - p. 13, L. 21; Tr., p. 17, LL. 17-22
(Sergeant testimony))--this fact alone suggests that Thrall was weighing her options and that she,
in fact, had options to weigh. The fact that there may be conflicting evidence in the record that

3 Even though Thrall's supervisors acknowledged that it was their intent to discharge
Thrall that day if Thrall did not resign, the supervisors consistently testified that Thrall was not
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this Court could rely upon to reach an opposite conclusion (i.e., that Thrall was coerced to
resign) does not warrant a reversal of the Commission's factual finding. Because there is
evidence in the record that a reasonable person could rely upon to conclude that Thrall was not
coerced, but that she consciously chose to resign because, weighing her options, she thought it
would be in her best interest, the Commission's finding of a voluntary quit must be upheld.
Thrall also argues that the Commission erred by concluding that Thrall bore the burden of
proving that her termination was not due to misconduct, and that imposing such a burden on
Thrall is in direct conflict with well-established Idaho law, which imposes the burden of proving
employee misconduct on the employer. Op. Br., at pp. 9-10. Even if the Commission did
impose the burden of proving misconduct on the wrong party (which is not what actually
occurred below), the Commission's doing so constituted harmless error, which does not warrant
a reversal on appeal. As explained in the next section, there is substantial and competent
evidence in the record that, assuming Thrall was in fact discharged, her discharge was for
misconduct, which precludes her from recovering unemployment benefits. Where there is
substantial evidence of misconduct in the record, determining who bore the burden of placing
that evidence in the record in the first place is a moot issue at this point.
Furthermore, when reviewing what the Commission actually concluded in this regard, it
is clear that the Commission effectively concluded that Thrall had failed to demonstrate, as she

told of this fact in their October 4 meeting. Tr., p. 13, LL. 12-21 (Sergeant testimony); Tr., p. 19,
LL. 12-20 (Miranda testimony).
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was required to do under Idaho law, that her termination, whether it was deemed a voluntary quit
or a discharge, occurred through no fault of her own. In other words, that her termination of
employment was not the result of her employee-related misconduct--or, if deemed a quit, that she
had good cause to quit. In this regard, the Commission effectively equated evidence
demonstrating a lack of employee-misconduct with evidence showing the existence of good
cause. R., Vol. I, p. 22 This is hardly an egregious error warranting reversal, where this Court
did the same thing in Hine. See Hine, 114 Idaho at 246, 755 P.2d at 1284 (concluding that
claimant's conviction for embezzling funds proved she did not have "good cause" for leaving her
employment voluntarily, since her conviction was based upon her own actions and it would, in
fact, have been appropriate grounds for the employer to discharge her for "misconduct" in
connection with her employment). Regardless, as previously noted, any error oflaw that may
have occurred in this regard is harmless where there is substantial and competent evidence in the
record that Thrall, if discharged, was discharged for misconduct in connection with her
employment.

B.

Alternatively, Substantial and Competent Evidence Exists to Support the
Commission's Finding that Thrall Was Discharged For Misconduct.
Even if this Court were to conclude that the Commission's finding that Thrall voluntarily

quit her employment without good cause constitutes clear error, the Commission's decision
denying benefits must still be upheld, where there is substantial and competent evidence in the
record to support the Commission's alternate finding that Thrall was discharged for misconduct

in connection with her employment.
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As explained in the Commission's written decision (R., Vol. I, p. 22), the underlying
facts in this case require the Court to apply the "standard of behavior" test for misconduct as set
forth in ID APA and governing Idaho case law--a characterization that Thrall herself does not
appear to challenge. Op. Br., at p. 11. Characterizing this case as a "standard of behavior" case
is proper, given that the present case does not involve a finding that Thrall engaged in either a
willful, intentional disregard of her employer's interests, or a deliberate violation of her
employer's reasonable rules, which are alternative definitions of "misconduct" for purposes of
Idaho's Employment Security Law. IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.a & .02.b. The "standard of
behavior" test for misconduct, as previously noted, applies if
the alleged misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior
which the employer has a right to expect of his employees, there is no
requirement that the claimant's conduct be willful, intentional or deliberate.
The claimant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant. The test for misconduct in
'standard of behavior cases' is as follows:
i. Whether claimant's conduct fell below the standard of
behavior expected by the employer; and
ii. Whether the employer's expectation was objectively
reasonable in the particular case.
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c (emphasis added). The IDOL regulations make it clear, however, that
"[m]ere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure of good performance as the result of
inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, isolated instances of ordinary negligence, or good faith
errors in judgment or discretion are not considered misconduct connected with employment."
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.03. Thrall relies on this exception to the regulatory definition of
misconduct to argue that the Commission's finding of misconduct is erroneous because the only
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evidence in the record suggests that, at most, her mistakes or en-ors were nothing more than
"ordinary inadvertencies made during good faith efforts to complete her work duties" --or, in
other words, her mistakes constituted nothing more than ordinary negligence. Op. Br., at p. 12.
The flaw in this argument is that it is not an accurate characterization of the evidence.
Rather, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the patient identification en-ors Thrall made
were not "isolated instances of ordinary negligence," IDAP A 09. 01.30.2 7 5. 03 (emphasis added);
rather, they were repeated and occurred throughout a six-month period. Tr., p. 14, L. 18-p. 15,
L. 6; R. Vol. I, p. 18. Other jurisdictions with similar regulatory definitions and exceptions as
those quoted above recognize that persistent negligence, in spite of prior warnings given, can
amount to misconduct that precludes an award of unemployment benefits. See, e.g., In the
Matter of the Claim of J. Nicholas, 804 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding that
substantial evidence supported finding that nurse practitioner/claimant's employment was
terminated due to disqualifying misconduct, where although claimant characterized her conduct
as a "mistake" which did not rise to the level of misconduct, she agreed her notation in medical
chart did not accurately reflect the procedure performed and she could have been more thorough,
and claimant had previously been warned about her job performance and notified that any further
indiscretions could lead to termination); In the Matter of tht Claim ofA. Mitch, 669 N.Y.S.2d 73
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (recognizing that persistent negligence in spite of prior warnings can
constitute misconduct). Here, it is undisputed that Thrall was given numerous prior warnings
that her job was in jeopardy for the identification en-ors she had made. Tr., p. 14, LL. 18-24; R.,
Vol. I, p. 18. In light of these prior warnings, even if Thrall's patient identification en-ors could
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be construed a mere negligence (and what a dangerous precedent that would be), this Court
should nonetheless conclude that Thrall's persistence in committing these err~rs, despite the
warnings, constituted misconduct disqualifying her for benefits. Indeed, such a ruling would be
consistent with IDAPA 09.01.30.275.03, which only makes an exception for "isolated" instances
of negligence.
Additionally, this Court should not overlook the fact that Thrall was working in the
medical field, where reliable and accurate laboratory results are critical to ensure patient health
and safety, which comprises the very heart of St. Luke's business purpose. Other jurisdictions,
when determining whether misconduct has occurred, consider not only the reasonableness of the
employer's rules, but also the nature of the employer's business and its effect on the public. In
particular, when a claimant violates an employer's policies or procedures implemented in a
hospital or medical setting, some courts impose a higher standard of behavior or expectations
that the claimant must satisfy in light of the hospital's duty to its patients. See Holly v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 617 A.2d 80, 83-84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding that

phlebotomist's misidentification of a patient's blood sample, in violation of hospital's procedure
for patient identification and labelling of specimens, despite progressive discipline for three prior
infractions, constituted misconduct which rendered the phlebotomist ineligible for
unemployment benefits; phlebotomist was fully aware of her hospital employer's identification
procedure and could be held to a high standard of behavior in light of the hospital's duty to its
patients). The court in Holly specifically recognized that, because hospital employees may be
held to a higher standard of behavior, a hospital employee's "inadvertent mistakes" should be
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deemed as willful misconduct disqualifying the employee from receiving unemployment
benefits. Id. at 83. This Court should adopt the rationale of the court in Holly and conclude that,
in light of the nature of St. Luke's business and its effect on the public, Thrall's patient
identification errors--even if construed as inadvertent mistakes--constitutes misconduct that
disqualifies her from receiving unemployment benefits, where said errors could have endangered
the life and safety of St. Luke's patients.
Finally, Thrall's reliance on Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 556
P.2d 859 (1976), is misplaced. Thrall cites certain language in Wroble as support for her
argument that merely making a rule of conduct and demonstrating that an employee has violated
that rule of conduct is not, in itself, "misconduct" sufficient to defeat an award of unemployment
benefits. Op. Br., at p. 12. Wroble, however, is distinguishable for the following reasons and
should be disregarded by this Court. First, unlike the present case, Wroble involved an
employee's deliberate violation of the employer's rules, which is not the circumstances here.
More importantly, the employee violation in Wroble involved a failure by the employee to
mention on his job application prior jobs the employee had held. 97 Idaho at 901, 556 P.2d at
860. Thus, the misconduct alleged in Wroble did not necessarily work to undermine the very
nature of the employer's business like the misconduct at issue here did. Given that the degree of
misconduct at issue here is much more severe than that at issue in Wroble, and that the present
case arguably involves a higher standard of conduct to be applied to medical personnel, this
Court should conclude that Wroble is not instructive.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the Commission's decision that
Thrall is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Respectfully submitted this 25 day of August, 2014.
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Attorneys for Employer-Respondent,
St. Luke's Regional Medical Center
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